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THE DYNAMITE CHARGE:  TOO EXPLOSIVE 
FOR ITS OWN GOOD? 
Sarah Thimsen, Brian H. Bornstein, & Monica K. Miller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2007, John White stood trial for shooting a teenage boy 
he feared was part of a mob intent on attacking him.1  The jury retired 
after hearing the case to determine whether to convict White of 
manslaughter, convict him of lesser charges, or not to convict him at all.2  
With a possible sentence of fifteen years in prison, the jury faced the 
unenviable task of profoundly affecting White’s future.3  Indeed, reports 
emerged indicating that tension reached a point where “a juror punched 
a wall and another slammed a bathroom door so hard the courtroom 
walls shook.”4  After four days of deliberation, including eleven hours 
that day, the jury informed the judge that it could not reach a decision in 
the case.5  The judge informed the jury that if it failed to reach a decision, 
it might have to return the next day, a Sunday, just two days before 
Christmas.6  François Larché, one of the two jurors reluctant to convict 
on the manslaughter charge, later told reporters he considered the 
process “‘a joke.’ That’s when I said ‘I’m out of here.’ It was a joke. 
There’s nothing further I can say then, ‘Okay, it’s a mockery, let’s go 
home.’”7  Forty-five minutes after the judge informed the jury it might 
have to return the next day, the jury found White guilty of second-
degree manslaughter.8 
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1 John White Trial Goes to Jury, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS, Dec. 19, 2007, 
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=5844519. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Patrick Whittle & Erik German, Jury in John White Trial Boiled with Tension, 
NEWSDAY.COM, Jan. 5, 2008, http://www.newsday.com/news/local/ny-lijury0106,0,6471 
802.story. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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John White’s case provides an illustration of a problem facing some 
courts:  When juries cannot reach a decision, in an effort to save time and 
money, judges can issue instructions that pressure jurors (intentionally 
or unintentionally) to reach a decision in the case at hand.9  Although 
such instructions might in fact result in decisions and therefore help 
avoid the costs of retrial, the decisions resulting from these instructions 
might result from suboptimal decision strategies.10  As the juror’s quote 
above indicates,11 in the face of judicial instructions jurors sometimes 
decide that agreeing with the majority of jurors is easier than holding to 
their own position.  This can create problems for all involved with the 
trial process, from the defendant to the juror himself. 
The American jury’s duty is to attend to evidence presented at trial 
and to make a decision regarding guilt and (sometimes) sentencing  (in 
criminal proceedings) or liability and damages (in civil proceedings) 
through the process of deliberation.  The jury has considerable freedom 
from court interference in performing this task.  As one court noted, a 
jury acts “as the finder of fact because it is designed to be a deliberative 
body, charged with the responsibility of exchanging ideas, and with the 
concomitant practices of arguing and influencing. A judicial barrier 
should not be erected in the jury room to discourage free and open 
discussion.”12  Given the potential far-reaching effects of a jury’s verdict, 
it is important that it reach the best conclusion it can based on a rational 
analysis of the available evidence.  Oftentimes, however, juries (and 
individual jurors) fail to utilize a complete, rational analysis 
methodology.13  Instead, normal psychological processes cause them to 
rely on mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to help them reach a decision.14  
These mental shortcuts are useful, but they are often suboptimal, 
meaning that the final verdict might not be the “best” decision.15  Jurors 
                                                 
9 See discussion infra notes 12, 22, 23.  
10 See discussion infra note 48. 
11 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
12 United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (1969). 
13 See, e.g., Ehud Kalai, A Rational Game Theory Framework for the Analysis of Legal and 
Criminal Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY DECISION MAKING 
235 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 By “best decision” we are not referring to the verdict the jury reaches, per se.  Instead, 
we mean to imply that juries reach the “best decision” when they arrive at a decision by 
employing rational decision strategies, utilizing the information they have available to 
them via evidence and testimony and attending to it, and applying the law correctly.  Juries 
can make poor decisions when they rely on the use of extralegal factors or fail to consider 
legally relevant variables in reaching their decision.  Group dynamics can also exert an 
influence on decision-making ability.  As we discuss infra Part IV.B, people often succumb 
to group pressure in order to reach a decision.  This can occur because one does not want to 
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are also susceptible to the influence of other jurors or even the judge, 
making their decision a result of pressure from other jurors16 or the 
desire to please authority figures.17  In fact, people conform to 
commands given by experts quite readily, which is exacerbated when 
people are under high cognitive load.18  Certain actions by the court can 
exacerbate the natural tendency to rely on these suboptimal heuristics. 
As the opening paragraph illustrates, one instance which can 
increase jurors’ susceptibility to heuristics and group influence is when 
they face a deadline for reaching a decision.  As illustrated in the John 
White case discussed above, this can happen when a judge issues jurors 
an Allen charge,19 otherwise known as the dynamite charge.  In essence 
the court is encouraging the deadlocked jury to try to reach a verdict.  
Meant to “blast” deadlocked jurors into making a decision, the dynamite 
charge creates stress and time pressure, both of which can result in 
jurors’ over-reliance on heuristics and an excessive influence of the 
majority in making a final decision.  In one case, for example, the jury 
returned a verdict only thirty minutes after receiving a charge from the 
judge instructing them to “reexamine [their] own views and to change 
[their] opinion if [they are] convinced [they] are wrong.”20  It was 
possible that, even before receiving a dynamite charge, the jury was close 
to a verdict and the dynamite charge simply gave it the nudge it 
needed;21 but the speed with which the jury, previously unable to reach a 
decision, returned a verdict after receiving this instruction from the 
                                                                                                             
upset the group dynamic by, for example, being the sole juror not agreeing with the 
majority, or one might go along with the majority in order to reach a quicker decision. 
16 For a discussion of the influence on group members’ decision making and individual 
conformity, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.  
17 See infra note 60, 99 and accompanying text. 
18 Lucian Gideon Conway & Mark Schaller, When Authorities’ Commands Backfire:  
Attributions about Consensus and Effects on Deviant Decision Making, 89 J. PERS. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 311 (2005); C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight:  Stereotypes on the 
Rebound, 67 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (1994) (demonstrating that stereotypes are useful 
to impression-formation, and activation and use can occur without the perceiver’s explicit 
instigation). 
19 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).  Although different forms of the charge 
exist, all trace back to the original Allen charge.  Throughout this paper, when referring to 
the Allen charge or dynamite charge, we are referring to any instruction to the jury to try to 
come to a decision and are not referring specifically to the original Allen charge. 
20 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 235 (1988). 
21 We liken this phenomenon to being easily able to open a previously recalcitrant jar lid 
after someone else has already loosened it. 
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judge suggests that it might have relied on suboptimal strategies to reach 
a verdict.22  
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the various aspects of the 
Allen charge with respect to the psychology of jury decision making.23  
Part II sets out a basic outline of the jury deliberation process.24  Part III 
focuses on hung juries, especially their frequency and their effects on the 
trial process.25  Part IV examines, in depth, psychological research on the 
effects of both time pressure and social pressure (from the judge and 
other jurors) on jurors’ decision-making ability.26  Part IV also reviews 
suggested ways to avoid negative effects of the dynamite charge.  
Finally, Part V discusses future research on the effects of the Allen 
charge.27 
II.  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY DELIBERATIONS 
During deliberation, juries typically move through a three-stage 
process.28  In the first stage, the so-called orientation stage, juries take care 
of procedural requirements, such as electing a foreperson and discussing 
relevant procedural issues, such as how and when to take votes.29  This 
stage helps jurors familiarize themselves with what will happen during 
the subsequent deliberations by establishing roles (e.g., electing a 
foreperson) and methods (e.g., procedures on how and when to vote).30  
It is in this stage that the jury’s deliberation style usually emerges. 
Research identifies juries as either “verdict driven” or “evidence driven,” 
and the particular style they adopt influences how a jury carries out 
deliberations.31  After the orientation stage, juries enter the open conflict 
                                                 
22 In fact, one of the indicators that the use of the Allen charge is not appropriate is the 
speed with which the jury returns the verdict after receiving the instruction from the judge.  
For example, see Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 612 (2000). 
23 For a more concise overview of the dynamite charge and its effect on deliberations, 
see Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Do Juror Pressures Lead to Unfair Verdicts?, 39 
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Mar. 2008, at 18. 
24  See infra Part II. 
25 See infra Part III. 
26 See infra Part IV. 
27 See infra Part V. 
28 MARK COSTANZO, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LAW 152–54 (2004); Garold Stasser, 
Information Salience and the Discovery of Hidden Profiles by Decision-Making Groups:  A 
“Thought Experiment,” 52 ORG’L. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 156–57 (1992). 
29 See COSTANZO, supra note 28, at 152. 
30 Id. 
31 See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 163 
(1983).  Verdict-driven juries begin deliberation by taking an initial poll and centering 
subsequent deliberations around that poll.  Id. at 163. When a jury is verdict-driven it sorts 
evidence into categories supporting each position.  Id.  Evidence-driven juries, on the other 
hand, begin, not with a poll, but rather with a discussion of the evidence presented at trial.  
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/4
2009] The Dynamite Charge 97 
stage, which comprises the actual deliberation stage.32  During this stage, 
jurors attempt to persuade those with whom they do not agree.  In this 
second stage, the jurors take their stance and argue for their side.  
Finally, juries (sometimes) reach the reconciliation stage, which occurs 
after a jury has reached a verdict and seeks to ensure that every juror is 
satisfied with the outcome.33  Group dynamics can affect all of these 
stages, especially the open conflict and reconciliation stages. 
Various types of social dynamics can influence the open conflict and, 
ultimately, the reconciliation stages.  Jurors face what researchers refer to 
as normative influence and informational influence.34  Normative influence 
refers to an individual publicly complying with group pressure, while 
still maintaining his or her initial beliefs.  A juror, for example, might 
outwardly go along with the group’s “guilty” verdict, while still 
believing the defendant to be not guilty.  In other words, the rest of the 
group has established a “norm” of guilt, and the holdout juror conforms 
to that norm.  Informational influence, on the other hand, results when 
people are genuinely persuaded by the arguments of others.  In that case, 
the rest of the group changes the holdout juror’s opinion about the 
defendant’s guilt.35  When discussing the negative effects of the Allen 
charge, a great deal of criticism focuses on implied normative influence, 
                                                                                                             
Id.  In this instance the jury sorts the evidence that seems to best fit together, without 
regard to the verdict.  Id.  After sorting the evidence the jury then decides on a verdict 
which is the best fit.  Id. at 163–64.  Aside from the different approaches for reaching a 
verdict, research indicates that evidence-driven juries examine all the evidence more 
closely, while verdict-driven juries tend to only thoroughly examine evidence as it relates 
to the potential verdict and also reach their verdicts more quickly than do evidence-driven 
juries, although no relationship exists between deliberation style and final verdict.  Id. at 
165.  Verdict-driven juries also lead to less overall satisfaction with the process than to 
evidence-driven juries.  Jurors who are part of a verdict-driven jury reported lower 
evaluations of their own, as well as other jurors’ contributions to the process, leading the 
authors to conclude that verdict-driven juries concern themselves less with others’ opinions 
and persuasiveness.  Id.  An analysis of actual juries found a negative relationship between 
initial voting time and evidence review, such that, the earlier the jury voted, the less likely 
it was to have agreed with indicators of evidence review.  Dennis Devine et al., Deliberation 
Quality:  A Preliminary Examination in Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 273, 295 (2007).  
Indicators of evidence review included, “(1) We went over the evidence in detail during the 
course of deliberation; (2) We went over each exhibit and the testimony of each witness in 
detail; and (3) I was satisfied with how thoroughly my jury reviewed the evidence.”  Id. at 
280. 
32 See COSTANZO, supra note 28, at 153. 
33 Id. 
34 See generally, Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity:  I.  A Minority of 
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS:  GEN. AND APPLIED, No. 9, 1 
(1956); Morton Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social 
Influences Upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955). 
35 See generally, Asch, supra note 34; Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 34. 
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with opinions emphasizing the danger of focusing on minority jury 
members and asking them to give greater weight to the majority’s 
opinions.36 
III.  HUNG JURIES 
Despite their best efforts, and in spite of various forms of social 
influence, jurors sometimes fail to reach a decision, resulting in a hung 
jury.  Hung juries are an essential consideration in a discussion of the 
dynamite charge, as the charge is only used with juries that have 
difficulty reaching a verdict and are at risk of hanging.  This section will 
address this important question:  How often do juries hang, and what 
can be done about them? 
A.  Rates of Hung Juries 
In many (possibly most) cases, the outcome is in little doubt and the 
jury quickly returns a verdict.  In other cases, however, juries have a 
more difficult time making a decision.  Whether due to the amount of 
evidence, complex testimony, personal factors affecting jurors’ feelings 
about a particular case, or the decision rule, in some instances juries 
simply cannot reach a decision.37  The decision rule is especially 
important.  Unanimity requirements can make reaching a decision more 
difficult for juries.  Not surprisingly, juries are more likely to hang if the 
court requires a unanimous verdict.  Unanimity is a double-edged 
sword.  By allowing non-unanimous verdicts (e.g., nine of the twelve 
must agree), courts are (theoretically) acting in a more efficient manner 
by assuring that the jury is more likely to reach a verdict.  Unanimity 
                                                 
36 See infra notes 59, 60. 
37 Valerie Hans and her colleagues have done a considerable amount of research 
analyzing the rate at which juries hang.  See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, 
Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 
78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1249 (2003); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor et al., Are Hung Juries A 
Problem?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Sept. 30, 2002, http://www.ncsconline. 
org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf [hereinafter Are Hung Juries 
A Problem?]; Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, How Much 
Justice Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at Hung Jury Rates, 83 JUDICATURE, 59 (1999); Valerie 
P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Hung 
Jury:  The American Jury’s Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 1 
(2003).  See also CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NON-UNANIMOUS JURY 
VERDICTS:  A NECESSARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 6 (May 1995); PLANNING & 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING CORPORATION, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FREQUENCY OF 
OCCURRENCE CASES EFFECTS AND AMOUNT OF TIME CONSUMED BY HUNG JURIES 4-30 to 4-37 
(1975). 
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requirements, however, ensure that each juror agrees with the verdict.38  
Requiring a unanimous verdict increases the pressures on jurors to reach 
a consensus, and can lead to greater reliance on normative influence and 
acquiescence to other social influences.  
Valerie Hans and her colleagues conducted a study of hung juries in 
both federal and state courts throughout the United States.  
Administering questionnaires to courts hearing non-capital felony jury 
cases,39 the researchers were able to obtain reports from judges, 
attorneys, and jurors.  With this information, they could attempt to 
establish the rates of hung juries and their causes. 
One difficulty with determining the frequency of hung juries, 
however, is that no clear consensus exists to define a hung jury.  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a hung jury is simply “a jury that 
cannot reach a verdict by the required voting margin.”40  As Hans and 
colleagues pointed out,41 however, jurisdictions vary in their 
interpretation of what constitutes a hung jury.  Some jurisdictions 
consider a jury hung “if it failed to reach a verdict on any charge or on 
any defendant.  In other jurisdictions, a hung jury was only counted if it 
hung on the most serious charge.  Some only counted a hung jury if it 
hung on all counts or on all defendants.”42  Despite varying definitions, 
these authors examined the rates of hung juries from 1980 to 1997 in a 
variety of state and federal courts.  Overall, their findings indicate that, 
in federal courts, rates of hung juries remained relatively stable over the 
course of their investigation, with rates of hung juries in federal courts 
ranging from 1.2% to 2%.43  State courts had a higher overall percentage 
of hung juries (6.2%), with considerably more variability, ranging from 
0.1% in Pierce County, Washington, to 14.8% in Los Angeles County, 
California.44  This study established that hung juries, while not common 
in every jurisdiction, do present a challenge for many jurisdictions.  
                                                 
38 As we explain in our discussion of normative influence, voting a certain way by no 
means guarantees that a juror genuinely agrees with that verdict.  See infra Part I & Part IV 
(discussing the time and social pressures on jurors).  Nonetheless, a unanimous decision 
rule is more likely to produce minority jurors who agree with the majority than a non-
unanimous decision rule, where there is not even the pretense of agreement. 
39 See Are Hung Juries A Problem?, supra note 37.  The authors concerned themselves with 
this particular arena because policymakers are often more concerned with this type of case 
than with a misdemeanor, for example. 
40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (3d pocket ed. 1996). 
41 Are Hung Juries A Problem?, supra note 37, at 2. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 22.  The highest instance of hung juries occurred in 1991, with a rate of 2.0%, 
while the lowest point in their analysis was in 1985, with a rate of 1.2%.  Id. 
44 See Are Hung Juries A Problem?, supra note 37.  The authors attribute this difference to 
geographical characteristics, noting that the statistics from the state courts involve smaller 
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B.  Why Hung Juries Matter 
When a jury hangs, the parties involved (i.e., judge, lawyers, clients) 
must determine how to proceed.  In some instances, the case will not 
even return to the courtroom. In fact, the research by Hans and 
colleagues indicated that over half (53.4%) of the cases in which the jury 
hung were not retried, with 31.8% being resolved by plea agreements 
and 21.6% being dismissed.45  Just over one-third of the cases returned to 
the courtroom.46 
Given the infrequency of hung juries, it is reasonable to ask why the 
legal system should be concerned about them.  There are several reasons.  
First, they are inefficient.  They consume legal system resources without 
producing a clear-cut outcome.47  Hung juries, almost by definition, 
consume more than their fair share of those resources, inasmuch as the 
jurors have to deliberate a long time before achieving hung status, and 
such trials require an additional investment of resources if they are 
retried.48  In an era when court dockets are severely strained and 
overburdened,49 the failure to resolve even a small percentage of cases 
compounds the problem.  Retrials, even in the small percentage of cases 
in which they occur, necessarily add to the inefficiency. 
Second, the non-outcome of a hung jury is likely to leave a sour taste 
in the mouths of some, if not all, of the parties.  Many civil plaintiffs, in 
particular, pursue litigation for reasons other than compensation, such as 
                                                                                                             
geographic areas than the federal courts.  Id.  They go on to suggest that complete data 
from all of the jurisdictions would most likely lower the states’ reported 6.2% hung jury 
rate.  Id. 
45 Id.  These data, although informative, came from only nine of the original thirty 
counties surveyed.  Id. 
46 Id. at 26.  Of the cases that went to retrial, the majority (32%) went to a jury and the 
remaining 2.4% were bench trials.  Id. 
47 One estimate is that trials cost approximately $10,000 a day.  George C. Thomas III & 
Mark Greenbaum, Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot of Hung Jury Instructions, 15 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 893, 917 (2007) (citing Dwayne Bray, Prosecutors Seek Change in Jury 
Voting, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at B1). 
48 In fact, courts sometimes note the expense of a trial as a reason for issuing the charge.  
See, e.g., United States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The trial has been 
expensive . . . .”); United States. v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 544–45 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The trial 
has been expensive in time, effort, money and emotional strain to both the defense and 
prosecution.  If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the case will be left open and may 
have to be tried again.  Obviously, another trial will only serve to increase the cost to both 
sides.”).  But see United States v. McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928, 945 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that emphasizing the cost of a retrial contributed to the coercive impact of the charge). 
49 One estimate is that it can take up to two years for civil cases to reach trial in federal 
courts.  Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms:  Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 
2004, at 56, 57–58. 
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obtaining closure.50  For criminal defendants, a failure to convict through 
a hung jury is undoubtedly preferable to a conviction, but it nonetheless 
lacks the vindication of an acquittal.  Attorneys, judges, and jurors in 
hung juries are likely to feel, in the absence of a verdict, that they have 
wasted their time.  Thus, hung juries are likely to leave most trial 
participants dissatisfied, not necessarily with the outcome of the case, 
but with the process.51 
Third, when a jury hangs and the case is not retried, justice is not 
necessarily being served.  Plea bargains and dismissals might lessen 
some of the inefficiencies associated with hung juries, but they are not 
necessarily optimal outcomes.  Most likely, they reflect the wearing 
down of the parties and concerns about further investments of time and 
money more than they do a concern about reaching the just outcome. 
C.  The Dynamite Charge 
As a means to avoid the costs and inefficiencies of a retrial, courts 
sometimes employ a technique referred to as an Allen charge (also 
known as a dynamite charge), utilized when juries report to the court that 
they cannot reach a decision.52  The Allen charge receives its name from 
the case of Allen v. United States,53 in which the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the use of instructions intended to keep the jury from 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and the Courthouse:  
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 645 (2008); 
Charles Vincent, Magi Young & Angela Phillips, Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of 
Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 50 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 103 
(1995). 
51 The concern here is that holdout jurors might be making the “right” decision but for 
the wrong reasons.  A lone juror might go along with the majority and correctly convict (or 
acquit) an individual, but if the process is distorted one might wonder if justice was truly 
served.  For example, even if the jury reaches a decision, knowing that one gave in to group 
pressure in order to reach that decision might lead to an overall negative view of the 
deliberation process. 
52 It is impossible to determine the incidence of the dynamite charge, because most cases 
in which it is used—whether the jury ultimately hangs or not—do not become part of the 
appellate record.  However, the substantial number of cases discussed in this section and 
the statement on its implementation by the American Bar Association suggest that its use is 
far from rare.  See supra note 42; infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
53 See 164 U.S. 492 (1896).  Interestingly, this was Allen’s third time in front of the 
Supreme Court.  His first appearance before the Court arose after his first conviction, which 
the Court then set aside, finding reversible error in the court’s expression of self-defense.  
150 U.S. 551, 516 (1893).  After a retrial and a second conviction, the Court reversed Allen’s 
case, finding the withdrawal of the claim of self-defense from the jury’s consideration 
erroneous, along with informing the jury that Allen’s arming himself with a pistol, even in 
the case of self-defense, would constitute murder.  157 U.S. 675, 681 (1895). 
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deadlock.54  Included in the instructions were the judge’s comments that, 
because it was unlikely that jurors would ever have “absolute certainty,” 
they should resume deliberations “with a proper regard and deference to 
the opinions of each other.”55  The judge specifically singled out jurors in 
the minority, noting that “they should listen, with a disposition to be 
convinced.”56 
As its nickname implies, the purpose of the dynamite charge is to 
“blast deadlocked juries into a verdict.”57  In simpler terms, the Allen 
charge tells those in the minority to pay more attention to what those in 
the majority have to say.  The Court recognized that jurors have the right 
to express their opinions, but also recognized the ultimate goal of the 
                                                 
54 Although the charge takes its name from the Supreme Court’s case, the use of the 
charge had been upheld previously.  See Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 
(1851); State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 (1881). 
55 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
56 Id.  The original Allen language came from a supplemental instruction in Tuey.  Id.  See 
Tuey, 62 Mass. at 1–3.  In its original language, the instruction read: 
[T]hat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be 
expected; that, although the verdict must be the verdict of each 
individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his 
fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor 
and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; 
that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously 
do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to 
each other’s arguments; that, if much the larger number were for 
conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many 
men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, u[p]on the 
other hand the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask 
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness 
of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. 
Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.  See also United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 415 n.18 (3d Cir. 
1969) (paraphrasing the Allen charge from Tuey).  In upholding the charge, the Supreme 
Court recognized: 
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the 
opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions 
may not be changed by conference in the jury room. The very object of 
the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and 
by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the 
law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments 
and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of 
the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. 
It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind 
determination . . . or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of 
men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself. There was no 
error in these instructions. 
Allen, 164 U.S. at 501–02. 
57 Saul M. Kassin, Vicki L. Smith & William F. Tulloch, The Dynamite Charge:  Effects on 
the Perceptions and Deliberation Behavior of Mock Jurors, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 537, 538 (1990). 
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jury is to reach a decision.58  Although the actual language involved with 
the Allen charge might not seem all that forceful in itself, it can have a 
powerful impact on jurors and deliberations.  By singling out minority 
jurors, judges can create an inherent amount of pressure for them to 
surrender their own views in favor of the majority position.59  Indeed, 
although Allen has never been overruled, a number of courts have 
recognized the inherent coercive power of the charge by singling out 
minority jurors and have adapted modified instructions to address the 
jury as a whole and not identify any specific person or persons.60  
Additionally, some courts now disallow the use of Allen altogether.61 
                                                 
58 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
59 See, e.g., State v. Voeckell, 210 P.2d 972, 979 (Ariz. 1949) (dissenting opinion).  The 
judge acknowledged the coercive impact of the dynamite charge: 
The majority think he is guilty; the Court thinks I ought to agree with 
the majority so the Court must think he is guilty.  While the Court did 
tell me not to surrender my conscientious convictions, he told me to 
doubt seriously the correctness of my own judgment.  The Court was 
talking directly to me, since I am the one who is keeping everyone 
from going home.  So I will just have to change my vote.’ 
Id. at 980 (internal quotations omitted).  See also United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 937 
(4th Cir. 1995) (reversing a conviction based on a coercive Allen charge); United States v. 
Cortez, 935 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1991); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1968) (courts must address both the majority 
and minority jurors).  As the Burgos court stated, “An evaluation of a suspect Allen charge 
must be conducted, in part, from the perspective of a juror in the minority, because ‘[t]hey 
always know their minority status, and if fearfully inclined, may presumably suspect a 
disgruntled judge can find them out.’” 55 F.3d at 940 (quoting United States v. Sawyers, 423 
F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1970)). 
 For a comprehensive review on conformity and coercion, see Jason D. Reichelt, 
Standing Alone:  Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 569 (2007). 
60 The American Bar Association has also offered suggestions for the modification of the 
Allen charge.  One of the modifications suggests that judges not single out jurors in the 
minority and suggest that they reconsider their own opinions in terms of the majority 
decision.  Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit No. 10.02 
(rev. ed. 1989); United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 In Fioravanti, for example, even though the court looked upon the Allen charge with a 
harsh eye, one of the reasons it declined to overrule the use of the charge was that it was 
given within the main body of the instructions (addressing all of the jurors, not just those 
disagreeing with the majority) and therefore not likely to be as coercive as when issued as 
its own supplemental charge.  412 F.2d at 419.  See also United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 
932 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding no improper use of the Allen charge, but recognizing that if 
given as a supplement rather than in the main body of the instructions tipped the balance 
in terms of coerciveness). 
 It is also important to recognize that pressure can come from the judge as well as other 
jurors.  Psychological research shows that people are susceptible to pressure from authority 
figures and can be extremely obedient to them. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO 
AUTHORITY 20–22 (1974).  In cases such as Lowenfield v. Phelps, then, when a judge 
admonishes a jury “to go back to the jury room and deliberate and arrive at a verdict,” 
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Although the Allen charge is a promising technique to avoid a hung 
jury, critics have raised a number of issues related to its use.  The 
remaining sections of this Article discuss some of the criticisms raised 
and examine them from a psychological perspective.  In particular, 
psychological research shows that the stress and time pressure induced 
by a dynamite charge can lead to suboptimal decision making. 
IV.  SITUATIONAL EFFECTS ON (RISKY) DECISION MAKING:  STRESS AND TIME 
PRESSURE 
The following subsections discuss forms of pressure jurors are likely 
to face when making decisions, such as the pressures that are 
exacerbated by the Allen charge.  We first discuss the effects of stress on 
decision making, followed by an explanation of the effect of time 
pressure on decision making. 
A.  Stress 
In psychological research, stress is defined in various ways, to 
encompass both features of an event and an observer’s physiological and 
subjective response to that event.62  As some define it, stress is “a 
negative reaction to the environment caused by too much pressure on 
the individual.”63  Within the context of decision making, there are 
several sources of stress, including people’s acknowledgment that they 
do not have all of the necessary knowledge to make an informed 
                                                                                                             
jurors feel they have little choice but to comply.  484 U.S. 231, 245 (1988) (finding the charge 
not coercive).  But cf. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 445 (1965) (per curiam) 
(reversing a conviction, holding the charge issued in the case was coercive).  The charge 
stated:  “You have got to reach a decision in this case.”  Id. 
 For a review of the status of the dynamite charge in state and federal courts, see 
Thomas & Greenbaum, supra note 47. 
61 See, e.g., Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 417 (referring to the charge as discredited).  Even the 
ABA has joined the cause, suggesting that courts modify the original charge.  AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (A.B.A. 
Standards, 1968) [hereinafter A.B.A. Standards]; American Bar Association, A.B.A. 
Standards for Criminal Justice §15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996).  But cf., United States v. Crispo, 306 
F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding use of Allen despite its being read twice in court and the 
identity of the lone holdout juror being revealed to the court); United States v. Melendez, 
60 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding use of the Allen charge).  See also Thomas & 
Greenbaum, supra note 47. 
62 See generally ROBERT E. FRANKEN, HUMAN MOTIVATION 266–300 (Brooks/Cole 
Publishing, 3d ed. 1994); HANDBOOK OF STRESS:  THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL ASPECTS (Leo 
Goldberger & Shlomo Breznitz eds., 1982) (discussing decision-making under stress). 
63 Jonathan L. Freedman & Donald R. Edwards, Time Pressure, Task Performance, and 
Enjoyment, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME:  NEW PERSPECTIVES 113 (Joseph E. McGrath 
ed., 1988). 
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decision, the “fear of suffering from various losses that would occur no 
matter which alternative were [sic] chosen, worry about unknown things 
that could go wrong when vital consequences are at stake, concern about 
making a fool of oneself in the eyes of others, and losing self-esteem if 
the decision works out badly.”64  
Jury duty is a situation with extreme potential to cause stress.  When 
deciding on a verdict, jurors are undoubtedly under a certain amount of 
stress.  Indeed, they are affecting the course of at least one person’s life.  
A jury voting to convict a man accused of rape, for example, affects not 
only his life, but the lives of his family and friends, as well as the lives of 
the victim and her family.  Having the ability to so alter a person’s life 
would be a stressful situation for most people.  Of course not all cases are 
so dire or have such serious outcomes, but it is unquestionably true that 
the decisions handed down by juries do have consequences for all 
involved.  Consistent with this supposition, research has consistently 
shown that jurors do indeed experience some level of stress, which 
deliberation may exacerbate.  
Several empirical studies indicate that jurors do report feelings of 
stress, starting with the summons65 to jury duty and sometimes lasting 
even after the trial is concluded.66  In its report on juror stress, the 
National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) reported that one of the main 
reasons people try to avoid jury duty involves the perceived stress 
associated with the task.67  The report identified four main reasons why 
people reported stress with their jury experience.  First, jurors face 
unpredictable situations, as they do not know how long the trial will last, 
the evidence to which they will be exposed, or if they will even fulfill 
their duty (if, for example, the case is settled mid-trial).68  Second, jurors 
reported that the process seemed like an inefficient use of time.69  A third 
                                                 
64 Irving L. Janis, Decisionmaking under Stress, in HANDBOOK OF STRESS:  THEORETICAL 
AND CLINICAL ASPECTS 56, 69–70 (Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Breznitz eds., 1982). 
65 According to the NCSC study, summons can create stress because they often do not 
include straightforward information, such as directions to the courthouse, parking 
facilities, and what will be expected of them when they report for jury duty.  NAT’L CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE JUROR:  A MANUAL FOR ADDRESSING JUROR 
STRESS 7 (1998), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_ 
JurorStressPub.pdf [hereinafter NCSC]. Other stressors involve missing work, being kept in 
uncomfortable surroundings and being treated as a member of an “assembly-line” of 
jurors.  Id. 
66 Id. at 47; Brian H. Bornstein et al., Juror Reactions to Jury Duty:  Perceptions of the System 
and Potential Stressors, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 321, 321–22, 339 (2005); Theodore B. Feldmann & 
Roger A. Bell, Juror Stress:  Identification and Intervention, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
409 (1993); Thomas L. Hafemeister, Juror Stress, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 177 (1993). 
67 NCSC, supra note 65, at 2. 
68 Id. at 5. 
69 Id. 
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source of stress involves the actors within the system, with jurors 
reporting “discourteous, insensitive and unhelpful staff.”70  Finally, 
jurors find their surroundings (e.g., courtroom, jury room, possibly 
hotel) uncomfortable.71  Taken together, these circumstances would be 
stressful for most people and are possibly more so for jurors charged 
with making potentially life-changing decisions.  Similarly, other factors 
inducing tension include complex legal instructions, sequestration, 
unproductive and disorganized deliberations, and uncomfortable 
surroundings.72  Further, according to the NCSC report, jurors report 
general anxiety about the deliberation process itself, particularly about 
making a mistake when reaching a verdict.73 
Another study found that, from a sample of actual jurors, 
approximately 40% reported feeling stress at some point.74  The most 
stressful events jurors reported involved reaching the actual decision 
itself.75  Respondents indicated that, while attempting to reach a 
decision, they focused on the potential effects their verdict could have 
for the interested parties.  Other factors contributing to jurors’ stress 
involved the complexity of the trial76 and the perceived effect jury duty 
would have on their daily lives.77  Feldmann and Bell78 also provided 
evidence that stress comes into play even after jurors have reached a 
verdict.  They noted that jurors can experience “intrusive thoughts of the 
trial, feelings of restlessness and agitation, sleep difficulties, and 
disturbing dreams,”79 particularly if the trial included graphic evidence. 
What effect does this stress have on jurors’ ability to make decisions?  
According to rational choice theory, when making a decision, people 
gather information about all of the possible solutions and then judge the 
available information they have against these solutions, ultimately 
leading to what they perceive to be the best decision regarding the 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  The study also provides useful recommendations about how to reduce levels of 
stress among jurors.  Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Bornstein et al., supra note 66, at 335. 
75 Id. at 335–36. 
76 Factors involved with the complexity of the trial included things such as difficulty 
understanding the law, difficulty deciding guilt, and difficulty understanding the 
testimony.  Id. at 332. 
77 Factors involved with disruption to daily life included elements such as long days in 
court, lengthy trials, disruption of a normal routine, length of deliberations, and trial 
interruptions.  Id.  See also Hafemeister, supra note 66, at 178. 
78 Hafemeister, supra note 66, at 178. 
79 Id. at 412. 
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problem.80  This would obviously be the preferred method of how juries 
reach verdicts.  Under stressful conditions, however, it is likely that 
juries often do not rely fully on rational processes to reach a verdict.  
Under conditions of high stress, for example, decision makers often 
exhibit premature closure, which occurs when one makes a decision 
without fully examining all of the possible alternatives.81  This can result 
in people “narrowing the range of perceived alternatives, overlooking 
long-term consequences, inefficient searching for information, erroneous 
assessing of expected outcomes, and using oversimplified decision rules 
that fail to take account of the full range of values implicated by the 
choice.”82  People also face what Janis identified as decisional conflict, 
which arises when decision makers feel additional stress when they 
perceive their anticipated losses as being high.  These losses include 
harm to one’s image of being a competent decision maker.83 
Under some circumstances, stress can increase performance, but 
only up to a point.84  This is captured by the Yerkes-Dodson law, 
according to which extremely low or extremely high levels of stress 
inhibit performance, but a moderate amount of stress can actually 
improve performance.85  The question remains, however, as to how 
much stress jurors actually face.  If the stress is moderate, it may help 
them reach the best possible decision, but extreme levels of stress might 
result in reliance on less-than-ideal judgment strategies. 
                                                 
80 For some classic literature in this area, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE:  AN INQUIRY IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY (University of Chicago Press 1969); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of 
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253 (1959). 
81 See Janis, supra note 64. 
82 Id. at 70.  Janis also provided a list of seven criteria deemed essential for effective 
decision making.  Id.  According to Janis, failing to meet any one of the criteria leads to 
deficient decision making.  Id.  Use of the dynamite charge might inhibit any one of the 
steps outlined and therefore result in inefficient decision making.  Id. at 71–72.  Janis 
contended that the greatest threat to effective decision making is hyper-vigilance, in which 
“the decisionmaker, in a paniclike state, searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma, 
rapidly shifts back and forth between alternatives, and impulsively seizes upon a hastily 
contrived solution that seems to promise immediate relief.”  Id. at 72. 
83 See Janis, supra note 64 and accompanying text.  A juror in the minority, faced with a 
majority supporting another decision, might feel that his or her competence as a decision 
maker is being questioned and go along with the majority in order to avoid having this 
negative image.  Id. at 72.  Further, as trials become more accessible to the public at large 
via television, the internet and newspapers, jurors feel additional stress to demonstrate that 
they can effectively reach a “good” decision.  Edie Greene & Leslie Ellis, Decision Making in 
Criminal Justice, in APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183, 185 (David Carson et 
al. eds., 2007). 
84 See Freedman & Edwards, supra note 63, at 127. 
85 Id. 
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B.  Group Dynamics 
Although criticism of the Allen charge has not focused on stress, per 
se, it has focused on the pitfalls of singling out certain (minority) jurors to 
re-examine their views in light of the views of other (majority) jurors.86  
Psychological literature is replete with evidence about the negative 
effects of being in a minority group,87 and since the majority of the 
criticisms of Allen focus on group dynamics, it seems a safe assumption 
that judges using an Allen charge are (inadvertently) adding to jurors’ 
stress.88  According to the Allen instructions, jurors in the minority 
should listen to other jurors “with a disposition to be convinced.”89  It 
seems the Court was encouraging informational influence; it wanted 
jurors to actually become persuaded that the majority was “right” and be 
willing to open themselves up to the majority’s persuasive powers.  
Unfortunately, research shows that when juries receive the Allen charge, 
they are actually more susceptible to normative influence.90 
The fact is, when people are in the minority in a group, they often 
succumb to pressure from the majority to behave in a certain way,91 even 
                                                 
86 See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 141–42 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 1994).  Courts in both cases held the Allen charge was 
not unduly coercive given the fact that the judge ceased polling the jury after the first non-
unanimous juror was identified.  Chigbo, 38 F.3d at 546.  Furthermore, the court was 
unaware of the numeric split of the jury when it issued the charge.  Cortez, 935 F.2d at 141.  
In Tucker v. Catoe, the court found the Allen charge coercive, partially because the court 
knew how the jury was divided.  221 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2000). 
87 Minority status can greatly exacerbate stress for individuals.  People often engage in 
the behavior of the majority in order to achieve some sort of in-group status.  This happens 
even when the majority behavior is detrimental to one’s well-being.  See, for example, 
Christian S. Crandall, Social Contagion of Binge Eating, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
588 (1988), showing that women in a sorority engaged in more binge eating when that was 
the behavior of the majority.  It is no stretch, then, to suggest that jurors in the minority 
might be more likely to vote with the majority so they are not in a group unto themselves.  
As Asch put it, “Mindful of the social rejection that often attends deviance, individuals 
strategically choose to go along with the crowd—at least in public—even if they do not 
privately endorse the popular opinion.”  See Asch, supra note 34, at 70.  See also Deutsch & 
Gerard, supra note 34; Reichelt, supra note 59. 
88 See supra Part IV.A (discussing juror stress). 
89 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). 
90 See e.g., Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 547. 
91 See generally Asch, supra note 34 (focusing on normative influences).  In his classic 
experiment on conformity, Solomon Asch had participants come into a room and look at 
lines presented on large white cards.  Id. at 3, 5.  On one card participants saw one line; the 
other card contained three lines.  Id. at 3.  The participant’s task was to choose which of the 
three lines was the same length as the line presented on the first card.  Id.  The line lengths 
were different enough to make the correct answer fairly obvious.  See id. (discussing the 
line lengths).  In groups of seven to nine, participants (in reality there was only one 
participant, all other members of the group were trained confederates of the researcher) 
went around the table one at a time and stated which line they thought was the closest to 
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if that behavior is inconsistent with what they (as individual jurors) 
believe.  Thus, even without explicit pressure from others, people will 
often succumb to implicit pressure from other group members.  Indeed, 
it has been suggested92 that the Allen charge unfairly targets jurors in the 
minority and these jurors are often subject to greater normative influence 
than their counterparts in the majority.  As one court stated, “The [Allen] 
charge ‘places the sanction of the court behind the views of the majority, 
whatever they may be, and tempts the minority juror to relinquish his 
position simply because he has been the subject of a particular 
instruction.’”93  This singling out of the minority makes its status more 
salient94 and might make it more susceptible to pressure from the 
majority.  Psychological researchers have obtained results supporting 
this position, studying the effect of the dynamite charge on mock juries.95  
Their research showed that mock jurors initially in the minority changed 
their vote more often in favor of the majority after they had received the 
dynamite charge.96  On the other hand, mock jurors in the minority who 
did not receive the dynamite charge showed no change in their voting 
preferences.97  Also, within groups receiving a dynamite charge, the 
                                                                                                             
the original line.  Id.  However, one of the participants did not know that that the majority 
had been instructed to choose a wrong line.  Id. at 1, 3.  At first, the unknowing participant 
seemed puzzled, but later on the same participant either was tempted to or actually did 
agree with the majority.  Id. at  10, 27, 69–70.  The effect of clearly being in the minority, and 
being so publicly, led a number (36.8%) of naïve participants to actually conform to the 
majority decision.  Id. at 10, 27–50 (providing data indicating the errors and interviews 
indicating why the participants behaved as they did).  In other words, even though these 
naïve participants knew the answer they were giving was wrong, they still gave it in order 
not to be in the minority.  Id. at 32–33 nn.21, 22 & 34.  Other explanations included that the 
participant thought everyone was just “following along” with the leader or that they had 
been subjected to optical illusions, or that the participant had not wanted to ruin the 
researcher’s results.  Id. at 28, nn. 18, 21, 31 & 32–33.  Another factor which influenced 
conformity was the number of people involved in the decision making task.  See id. at 39–40 
(describing one participant’s viewpoint on social pressure).  When faced with one other 
person, participants stood their ground the majority of the time.  See id. at 39–40 (describing 
one participant’s viewpoint on social pressure).  However, when faced with two opposing 
viewpoints, Asch noticed more people starting to conform, a trend which only got stronger 
as the number of confederates increased.  Id.  Similarly, if those in the minority had at least 
one person “on their side,” they tended to yield less frequently than if they were in the 
minority on their own.  See supra note 34. 
92 AMY J. POSEY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, TRIAL CONSULTING 147 (2005). 
93 People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1005 (Cal. 1977) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 468 
F.2d 652, 662). 
94 See Feldmann & Bell, supra note 66, at 414. 
95 Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 547; see also Vicki L. Smith & Saul M. Kassin, Effects of the 
Dynamite Charge on the Deliberations of Deadlocked Mock Juries, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 640 
(1993). 
96 Id. 
97 Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 547. 
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researchers observed that participants in the majority actually applied 
more social pressure, while participants in the minority “imagined 
pressures that did not exist.”98 
Another social factor influencing jury behavior is the (implied) 
pressure from the judge.  Because judges are in a position of power, 
jurors are likely to do exactly what the judge instructs.  While this is 
generally desirable, studies abound showing that people are willing to 
listen to authority figures, even if it leads them to act in a manner in 
which they are uncomfortable or to reach an undesirable outcome.99  In 
cases involving the dynamite charge, then, it seems clear that jurors 
would feel pressure from an authority figure (i.e., the judge) and comply 
with his request, even if compliance does not gel with the juror’s 
individual preference.100  In line with this,101 research shows that mock 
jurors in minority positions reported feeling more pressure from the 
judge to reach a decision than did those in the majority.  Indeed, even 
though juries have a right to hang, research indicates that the majority of 
jurors (even those who had previous jury experience) are not aware of 
this, and when they receive the Allen charge from the judge they take it 
as an indication that a verdict is required (91% in the dynamite charge 
condition v. 55% in a control condition).102  Social influences, then, 
                                                 
98 Id. at 548; Smith & Kassin, supra note 95, at 641. 
99 A classic study in the realm of obedience to authority is that of Stanley Milgram.  See 
MILGRAM, supra note 60, at 20–22.  Through a series of trials, Milgram found that he could 
get participants to shock another participant to the point of serious injury or even possible 
death.  Id. at 23.  Although the participants administering the shocks expressed discomfort 
with their actions, they continued to listen to the researcher, who simply instructed that the 
research must continue.  Id. at 21.  This study illustrates that, even if it is something with 
which people are uncomfortable, most will comply with what an authority figure tells 
them to do because that person “must know best.”  Id. at 20–22. 
100 Interestingly, the judge is not the only authority figure jurors face.  Often the 
foreperson of the jury is seen as having an authoritative role and his/her stance can 
influence holdout jurors’ ultimate decisions.  See Devine et al., supra note 27, at 296.  The 
relationship with the authority figure can be uncertain at times, however.  For example, 
when people feel they are being told what to do, psychological reactance can occur.  
Psychological reactance refers to the tendency of people to establish their free will in the 
face of an order and do the opposite of what is being ordered.  Why reactance does not 
occur more often, then, is likely due to several factors.  First of all, as Conway and Schaller 
suggested, if people are still under an authority figure’s rule (as jurors likely perceive 
themselves to be), they are less likely to deviate.  Conway & Schaller, supra note 18, at 311.  
Second, when under cognitive load, a reactance effect was unlikely to occur.  Id. at 322.  
Finally, the perceived expertise of the authority figure moderates the effect:  people 
demonstrate greater obedience to commands from ‘expert’ authority figures, a category 
into which judges (likely) fall.  See id. at 315 (stating that people are likely to obey 
commands from expert authorities). 
101 See Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 547; Smith & Kassin, supra note 95, at 648. 
102 See Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 548. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/4
2009] The Dynamite Charge 111 
whether overt or implied, can play a large part in the dynamics of jury 
(and juror) decision making. 
C. Time Pressure 
Stress and social influence can increase the pressure on a holdout 
juror to reach a decision quickly, so as not to inconvenience the other 
jurors, the judge, or the court.  These factors place the juror under 
pressure to reach a decision in a limited amount of time.103  Like stress, 
when faced with time pressure, people often use less-than-ideal 
strategies to help them make a decision.  Courts recognize that time, 
unlike stress, plays a role in decision making.  In fact, the time it takes to 
return a verdict is one of the factors courts look at in order to determine 
whether the Allen charge is coercive.  As one author observed, “the 
degree of coerciveness behind a supplemental Allen charge [is] inversely 
proportional to the length of time the jury spent deliberating after the 
charge was given.”104 
The adage that “time is relative” seems to apply here as well—what 
kind of time limit qualifies as coercive?  Thirty minutes, one hour, a day?  
                                                 
103 Jurors might feel the effect of time pressure from a variety of sources.  See, e.g., Whittle 
& German, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing that the judge noted the proximity of the case to 
Christmas, perhaps indicating to the jurors that they should reach a decision soon so as to 
be able to conclude the trial in time for the holiday).  See also infra notes 104-08 and 
accompanying text (discussing the effects of imposing definite and indefinite time limits on 
jury deliberations). 
 Similarly, since most jurors do not know of their right to hang, once they are at a 
standstill, holdout jurors might feel more pressure to quickly cast their verdicts in accord 
with the rest of the jury to avoid the stressful situation of jury deliberations.  See Smith & 
Kassin, supra note 95, at 548 (stating that most jurors do not know they have a right to 
hang).  It is also possible that if the jury indicates it cannot reach a decision, requiring the 
jurors to continue deliberations might cause them greater feelings of stress and frustration 
because they have mentally prepared for the conclusion of their service.  Having the judge 
inform them that they are to resume deliberations might create more stress and also 
increase jurors’ feelings of having to reach a decision in a timely manner in order to 
alleviate that stress. 
104 David M. Stanton, Note, United States v. Arpan:  How Does the Dynamite Charge Affect 
Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REV. 461, 471 (1990).  See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 935 
F.2d 135, 142 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding the Allen charge uncoercive because the jury continued 
deliberating for four-and-a-half hours after receiving the charge).  But cf. Tucker v. Catoe, 
221 F.3d 600, 612 (2000) (finding that a deliberation of one-and-a-half hours after receiving 
the Allen charge and after an initial ten hours of deliberation indicated potential coercion).  
Contrast Tucker with United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971), where the 
court found the use of the Allen charge was coercive and noted that when giving the charge 
to the jurors the trial judge pointed out to the jury that it was a Friday afternoon, which the 
appellate court recognized as possibly indicating to the jury that it should reach a decision 
before the end of the day.  Similarly, in United States v. Chaney, 559 F.2d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 
1977), the judge implied to the jury that it would be locked up all night if it failed to reach a 
verdict. 
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According to Ben Zur and Breznitz, time pressure “can be defined in 
terms of the amount of information that has to be considered and 
processed during one time unit or in terms of the time allotted for 
processing a fixed amount of information.”105  Juries often seek help from 
the judge only after deliberating for a length of time.  When the judge 
instructs the jury to resume deliberations, it is reasonable to expect that 
certain jurors (especially those in the minority) feel that they should 
reach a decision106 in a timely manner. 
Research107 consistently shows, however, that making decisions 
under time pressure has adverse effects on decision making, such as 
reducing a decision maker’s accuracy threshold.108  Another effect of 
time pressure on decision making is that those under pressure attend 
less to certain information deemed unimportant.  This step possibly 
leads to an overuse of heuristics,109 with the jury focusing only on 
                                                 
105 Hasida Ben Zur & Shlomo J. Breznitz, The Effect of Time Pressure on Risky Choice 
Behavior, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 89, 89-90 (1981). 
106 In fact, in the control group (where mock jurors received no dynamite charge), 55% 
believed a verdict was required.  See Kassin et. al., supra note 57, at 547-48.  In the condition 
in which mock jurors received a dynamite charge, the number of participants believing the 
judge required a verdict jumped to 91%.  Id. 
107 See, e.g., Ben Zur & Breznitz, supra note 105; Itiel E. Dror ET AL., Decision Making Under 
Time Pressure:  An Independent Test of Sequential Sampling Models, 27 MEMORY & COGNITION 
713 (1999); Dan Zakay, The Impact of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making Under Time 
Stress, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 59-69 
(Ola Svenson & John A. Maule eds., 1993). 
108 When making a decision, one has a subjective “sufficiency threshold,” which lets the 
decision maker know how much information is required to make a “good enough” 
decision.  If a person is out hiking in the woods, for example, is it “good enough” for the 
person to know that the four-legged furry creature approaching is an animal, or is the 
threshold higher, leading the person to distinguish that creature as a bear rather than a 
dog?  When the judge charges the jury to hurry up and make a decision already, jurors 
might lower their sufficiency threshold.  They may revert to the use of heuristics and 
abandon a detailed examination of the evidence in order to facilitate decision making.  
Although not personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt, a juror might lower her 
threshold (and become more susceptible to normative influence) and decide the evidence is 
“good enough” to justify a vote for conviction. 
 In early research demonstrating the effects of time pressure on decision making, Ben 
Zur and Breznitz illustrate that under significant time pressure, participants chose less 
risky alternatives.  See Ben Zur & Breznitz, supra note 105, at 101-02.  The authors suggest 
that choosing a less risky alternative is a way to reduce one’s apprehension about a certain 
situation.  Id.  They went on to note that, if given enough time to fully consider and 
appraise information and evidence, people reported feeling less cognitive strain and were 
less concerned with their potential inadequate performance.  Id. at 102.  Further, when not 
faced with time pressure, after making an initial judgment, decision makers have the ability 
to reconsider all facts and base their decision on all of the available information and 
perhaps reevaluate their initial decision.  Id. at 103.  See also Dror et. al., supra note 107, at 
722. 
109 See supra Part IV.C (discussing overreliance on heuristics). 
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information that is central to the issue involved and ignoring less central 
(though still legally relevant) information. 
A jury faced with an inferred time limit, however, does not always 
enjoy the luxury of a rational (i.e., timely) choice.  In terms of jury 
behavior, one could suggest that jurors in the minority choose a less 
“risky” alternative, when they feel time pressure, by agreeing to side 
with the majority.  The charge states “if the much larger number were for 
conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many 
men.”110  If “so many men” chose one alternative, it might seem less 
risky for holdout jurors to go with the majority.  After all, if there is 
“safety in numbers,” one should side with the majority for safety’s sake.  
The risk they are avoiding in this case is being the lone holdout on a jury, 
an adverse social position. 
Time pressure also promotes feelings of helplessness, which leads a 
decision maker to disregard information he feels is important simply 
because there is not enough time to evaluate it adequately.  Giving an 
Allen charge would likely cause juries to shift their approach from being 
evidence driven to verdict driven.111  Under conditions of “time stress,” 
decision makers often exhibit a reduction in information search and 
processing.112  With the implied pressure to reach a verdict in a timely 
manner, juries initially focused on thoroughly examining the evidence 
might suspend this process and adopt a process of searching for 
information that can conveniently fit into one verdict category or 
another.  Similarly, jurors might exhibit the “tendency to use a strategy 
of information filtration, that is, information that is perceived as most 
important is processed first, and then processing is continued until time 
is up.”113  By switching strategies jurors again might focus on the 
evidence that is deemed most “important” to reach a certain verdict, to 
the exclusion of other relevant but less “important” information.  Indeed 
one common reason for objection to the Allen charge is that juries 
sometimes reach verdicts within a short amount of time after receiving 
instructions from the judge.114  Nevertheless, courts retain a large 
                                                 
110 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). 
111 See Hastie et al., supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
112 See Zakay, supra note 107, at 60. 
113 Id. 
114 For example, in United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 1994), after receiving 
a charge from the judge a deadlocked jury returned a verdict within fifteen minutes.  
Furthermore, the judge explicitly informed the jury that it had no time limit to reach a 
decision.  Id.  The judge instructed the jury:  “You may be as leisurely as you wish in your 
deliberations and should take all the time which you may feel is necessary.”  Id.  The 
appellate court upheld the use of the charge because polling ended after the judge 
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amount of discretion in determining an “appropriate” length of time for 
deliberations.115 
D. The Effects of Stress and Time Pressure:  Over-reliance on Heuristics 
Due to the effects of stress and time pressure on decision making, 
jury deliberations are prime situations for the use of heuristics or “rules 
of thumb” meant to help people make decisions in certain circumstances.  
The goal of heuristics is to “reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”116  
Although helpful in a number of situations, heuristics can lead to 
erroneous conclusions.117 
                                                                                                             
determined there was no unanimity, which diminished the charge’s potential coercive 
impact, and noted that the speed of the returned verdict did not influence their decision 
about the coerciveness of the charge.  Id. at 546. 
115 In United States v. Pope, 415 F.2d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 
(1970), the jury received an Allen charge after eleven hours of deliberation.  Id.  Four hours 
after receiving the charge the jury returned a verdict.  Id.  In United States v. Flannery, 451 
F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971), however, the court found the use of the Allen charge was 
coercive and reasoned that in giving the charge to the jurors the trial judge pointed out to 
the jury that it was a Friday afternoon, which the appellate court recognized as possibly 
indicating to the jury that it should reach a decision before the end of the day.  Stanton 
observed that “the degree of coerciveness behind a supplemental Allen charge [is] inversely 
proportional to the length of time the jury spent deliberating after the charge was given.”  
Stanton, supra note 104, at 471. 
 In United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 884 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting U.S. v. Grosso, 358 
F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1966)), rev’d. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)) the court stated:  
“‘The length of time a jury may be kept together for the purpose of deliberation is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial judge, and his action in requiring further deliberation after 
the jury has reported a disagreement does not, without more, constitute coercion.’” 
 United States v. Walrath, 324 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 2003) offered four indicators of 
coercion:  “Jury coercion is determined by (1) the content of the instruction, (2) the length of 
the deliberation after the instruction, (3) the total length of deliberations, and (4) any indicia 
in the record of coercion.” 
116 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). 
117 For an interesting defense of the use of heuristics, see Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (Gerd Gigerenzer & Chris Engel eds., 2006).  In addition to noting 
their usefulness, Gigernezer claims that it is unfair to accuse heuristics of leading to biased 
judgments.  Id.  This is due to the fact that “heuristics are evaluated against divine ideals, 
which makes them appear to be all-to-human failures.”  Id. at 21.  The argument might be 
made, therefore, that jurors must rely on heuristics because, in most cases some ambiguity 
exists and there is no “divine ideal,” or clearly correct answer.  But cf. Russell Korobkin, The 
Problems with Heuristics for Law, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 47 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Chris 
Engel eds., 2006) (noting that using heuristics can produce and over- or under-reliance on 
previously held beliefs and stereotypes). 
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People use heuristics under a variety of circumstances.118  First, 
people most often use heuristics when they do not have adequate 
cognitive resources to devote to making a particular decision, if, for 
example, they are distracted or are under pressure to make a quick 
decision.  People also use heuristics if they are not motivated to devote 
time and mental energy to making a decision.  Evidence suggests that 
these mental shortcuts are present when juries engage in their decision 
making tasks.  While one hopes that juries are not distracted when 
deliberating or unmotivated to reach a fair conclusion, when faced with 
a forceful instruction from the judge to try to make a decision, and with 
implied time pressure, jurors might revert to the use of heuristics to help 
them reach a decision.119  Finally, people often use heuristics in situations 
of uncertainty.120  Jurors are often in situations of uncertainty; indeed, it 
is their verdict that is intended to provide certainty for the court and 
society by giving a final judgment about a dispute.121 
People utilize a number of heuristics, even in cases of legal decision 
making.122  One of the most common types of heuristic is the availability 
heuristic, employed when people try to determine the likelihood that 
some event has occurred.123  The ease with which something comes to 
mind (i.e., its availability) increases reliance on it.124  One recent example 
of how the availability heuristic might affect legal decision making 
involves the recently decided O.J. Simpson robbery case.  Because of 
Simpson’s sensational trial in 1995, which fascinated much of the nation 
                                                 
118 See supra note 115 (discussing cases in which juries were given varying lengths of time 
for deliberations); Nyla R. Branscombe & Brian M. Cohen, Motivation and Complexity Levels 
as Determinants of Heuristic Use in Social Judgment, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 
145-60 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991). 
119 Research shows that people often rely on stereotypes as an adaptive tool to help them 
efficiently make judgments when under cognitive stress.  See, e.g., Macrae et al., supra note 
18. 
120 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 1124. 
121 For a general overview of the most commonly discussed heuristics (availability, 
representativeness, anchoring, and adjustment), see infra Part IV.D.  For more thorough 
discussions of how these heuristics apply to legal settings, see Lori H. Colwell, Cognitive 
Heuristics in the Context of Legal Decision Making, 23 AM J. FOR. PSYCHOL. 17 (2005); 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 117; Greene & Ellis, supra note 83. 
122 See Greene & Ellis, supra note 83, at 184. 
123 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 1127. 
124 Id.  For example, people might believe that more people die each year in plane crashes 
than in automobile crashes, which occurs because we hear more about plane crashes that 
claim a number of lives at one time but when we hear about automobile accidents they 
usually do not involve the same number of people or generate the same amount of press 
coverage as plane crashes.  The number of people dying in plane crashes is more salient 
and therefore more accessible, leading people to erroneously conclude that more people die 
in plane than automobile crashes.  See generally id. (discussiong availability and salience of 
information and its subsequent effects on decisions). 
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and received extensive media coverage, some potential jurors for his 
2008 robbery trial reported difficulty separating this case from Simpson’s 
past.  For them, the mere mention of Simpson’s name or seeing him in 
person brought to mind the highly available information from his first 
trial.  One potential juror noted, for example, that she felt Simpson got 
away with murder after his acquittal.  Although the two trials were not 
related, the availability of information about his first trial interfered with 
the jurors’ and the public’s ability to focus exclusively on the facts of the 
case at hand.125 
Another frequently cited heuristic is the representativeness heuristic.126  
Here too, people focus on the probability of some event, focusing on the 
similarity between two outcomes to determine probability.127  Jurors 
frequently use this heuristic to determine whether a criminal defendant 
is guilty or not.  For example, jurors might think that a suburban 
housewife is not representative of a “typical” drug dealer and must be 
not guilty when accused of selling drugs.128  In this fashion, people use 
stereotypes as a means of making judgments about others.  Stereotyping 
involves “applying to an individual one’s cognitive expectancies and 
association.”129  Hence, stereotypes clearly relate to the 
representativeness heuristic, as both deal with the expectations one has 
and how adequately a stimulus fits with those expectations.  Reliance on 
stereotypes is greater when people must make a decision under pressure 
or high cognitive load.130  Moreover, if one is aware of a stereotype he 
holds and tries to suppress it (as a juror might do), it can actually 
                                                 
125 See, e.g., Simpson jury selection could take awhile, http://www.fox5vegas.com/ 
news/17433489/detail.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).  Simpson’s conviction in his recent 
robbery trial does not conclusively show that availability of information from his earlier 
murder trial (and acquittal) exerted an influence, but it is consistent with that 
interpretation. 
126 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 1124. 
127 Id. 
128 Jurors sometimes also disregard the base rate of certain events and, instead, focus on 
whether the accused fits with their preconceived notion of the idea of what one accused of 
the offense should look like.  For example, if jurors know that 85% of people living in a 
particular town are drug dealers, the odds of a drug-dealing suburban housewife are 
greater.  People ignore such base rate information, however, concluding that since the 
suburban housewife is not representative of what a “typical” drug dealer looks like, 
regardless of the odds, she must be the exception rather than the rule. 
129 SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS:  A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
398 (Wiley 2004). 
130 See Macrae et al., supra note 119; Martin F. Kaplan, Tatiana Wanshula & Mark P. 
Zanna, Time Pressure and Information Integration in Social Judgment, in TIME PRESSURE AND 
STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 
Plenum Press 1993). 
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“rebound” and influence judgment more strongly than it would have in 
the first place.131 
Another oft-cited heuristic that can influence jury verdicts is the 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic.  When making a decision, people use 
an initial value (the anchor) and adjust upward or downward from that 
position.  Their final decision, then, is based on that initial value.  In 
research examining civil jury awards, jurors often use some initial value 
provided (e.g., the damage amount sought by the plaintiff) as their 
anchor and adjust their damage awards accordingly.132  For example, 
mock jurors were presented with a re-enactment of a trial involving 
parents who sued a defendant for the wrongful deaths of their two 
children.133  In one re-enactment, the plaintiff’s lawyer requested an 
award of two million dollars; in the other, twenty million dollars.134  The 
results showed that in the first re-enactment, the average award was just 
over one million dollars.135  In the second re-enactment, however, the 
average award was just over nine million dollars.136  It is important to 
recognize that jurors are not the only party susceptible to the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic.  In her research, Birte Englich137 found that 
attorneys’ sentencing recommendations influenced judges’ sentencing 
decisions.  
Thus, evidence for the negative effect of time pressure and stress on 
decision making is well established in the psychological literature.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that under conditions of time pressure or 
stress, people revert to less-than-ideal cognitive strategies to make 
decisions.  These strategies include the use of heuristics, selective 
                                                 
131 See generally Macrae et al., supra note 119. 
132 See generally Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created 
Equal:  The Effects of Per Diem versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 33 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. (2009); Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Consulting on Damage Awards, in 
HANDBOOK OF TRIAL CONSULTING (R.L. Wiener & B.H. Bornstein, eds., forthcoming). 
133 Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a 
Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 991, 1002, 1013-16(1995). 
134 Id. at 1003, 1010. 
135 Id. at 1010. 
136 Id. at 1006.  Several other studies have yielded comparable findings.  See, e.g., Gretchen 
B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get:  Anchoring in 
Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519 (1996); Birte Englich et al., 
Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences:  The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial 
Decision Making, 32 PERSONAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Mollie W. Marti & 
Rosselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For:  The Effect of Anchors on Personal-Injury 
Damage Awards, 6 J. EXP. PSYCHOL.:  APP. 91 (2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. 
Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:  The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). 
137 See supra note 136. 
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information processing, and a lowering of one’s decision threshold.138  
Given the fact that juries typically receive the Allen charge only after 
already engaging in a significant amount of deliberation, jurors in the 
minority almost certainly infer some sort of time pressure for them to 
make a decision.  
E. Issues in Applying Psychological Research to Jury Behavior 
Before drawing general conclusions, it is important to acknowledge 
the limitations of applying the results of these studies to jury decision 
making.  First of all, in a number of experimental studies,139 participants 
received explicit instructions about the amount of time they had to make 
a decision, which is unlikely to be the case in a trial.  Also, participants in 
several studies had a relatively short time to make decisions (e.g., 
seconds or minutes), rather than the additional hours or possibly days 
that real jurors have to reach a decision.  Finally, the research dealing 
directly with the dynamite charge used mock juries, which might behave 
in ways different from an actual jury.140  In a study by Kassin and his 
colleagues, for example, participants did not engage with others during 
deliberations, but rather communicated via note passing,141 with the 
participant rendering a verdict, offering a one-to-two sentence 
explanation and then receiving the other participants’ verdicts and 
explanations.  Similarly, in another study, the researchers constructed 
juries based on participants’ pre-deliberation verdict preferences.142  
Additionally, they considered juries to be deadlocked after only twenty 
minutes of deliberation without reaching a verdict, and all juries were 
disbanded after fifty minutes had elapsed.143 
Even with these limitations, however, implied time pressure might 
still exert an influence on jurors and affect their decision making 
processes.  Aside from time pressure constraints, a number of social 
influences both inside and outside of the jury room can affect a juror’s 
ultimate decision.  The case of John White’s jury illustrates this point, 
with two jurors admitting that they ultimately decided to go along with 
the group consensus due to frustration with the process.144  Indeed, 
courts seem to recognize the negative ramifications of imposing a 
                                                 
138 See supra Part IV.C–D. 
139 See, e.g., Ben Zur & Breznitz, supra note 105, at 96; Dror et al., supra note 107, at 715; 
Kaplan et al., supra note 130, at 262. 
140 See Kassin et al., supra note 57, at 548 
141 In reality participants acted alone; the notes from other “jurors” had been created by 
the researcher.  See Kassin et al., supra note 57. 
142 See Smith & Kassin, supra note 95, at 602-03. 
143 Id. 
144 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
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deadline on jury deliberations, as it sometimes serves as a basis for 
appeal.145  Although not exactly the same as deliberations in an actual 
case, the results from the studies above confirm that judges may be 
correct when they identify the numerous problems associated with the 
Allen charge. 
F. Avoiding the Negative Effects Associated with the Allen Charge 
Several suggestions are offered in response to criticisms of the Allen 
charge by various sources.  For instance, the American Bar Association 
offered a revised instruction for hung juries, which does not single out 
the minority,146 but rather instructs all jurors to examine and re-examine 
their own views, and not to be afraid of changing their minds, but also to 
stick with what they believe is the right “answer.”147  The ABA’s 
suggested instruction states: 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and 
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if 
you can do so without violence to individual judgment.  
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so 
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence 
with your fellow jurors.  In the course of you 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own 
views and change your opinion if convinced it is 
erroneous.  But do not surrender your honest conviction 
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of 
the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict.148 
The ABA also suggests including the instruction before deliberations 
begin, rather than waiting until the jury has trouble reaching a decision.  
Although it recognizes the judge’s right to issue the charge again when a 
                                                 
145 See generally notes supra 86, 104, 106, 110, 114 and accompanying text. 
146 In fact, singling out the juror(s) in the minority is one of the hallmarks of determining 
the Allen charge’s coerciveness.  Nevertheless, even if the judge is unaware of the identity 
of these jurors, the holdouts are not truly unanimous, as the other jurors are aware of their 
identity.  As one court noted, “[t]he dissenters, struggling to maintain their position in a 
protracted debate in the jury room, are led into the courtroom and, before their peers, 
specifically requested by the judge to reconsider their position.”  People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 
997, 1005 (1977).  Even if the judge does not specify any juror in particular, jurors still feel 
singled out by the charge.  See State v. Voeckell, 210 P.2d 972, 979 (Ariz. 1949) (Udall, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the coercive effects of the Allen charge). 
147 A.B.A. Standards, supra note 61, at 5. 
148 Id. 
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jury is deadlocked, by including the charge in the main body of the 
instructions, courts can avoid drawing attention to any one juror; 
instead, the charge applies to every juror.149  Also, by including the 
charge in the main body of the instructions the judge is placing equal 
weight on all of the instructions.  Giving the charge on its own could 
possibly signal to the jury that it is somehow more important than the 
other instructions provided by the court.  Finally, the revised instruction 
tells jurors not to bend to majority pressure and emphasizes that the jury 
need not necessarily return a verdict.150  This can be especially useful as 
jurors often assume that they must return a verdict in a case.151 
Arizona has a unique way of dealing with deadlocked juries that 
helps ameliorate some of the problems associated with the traditional 
charge.152  Arizona judges submit a note to the jury asking if the judge or 
attorneys can provide any assistance with the deliberation process if it 
appears that the jury is having trouble reaching a verdict.  Things such as 
“giving additional instructions; clarifying earlier instructions; directing 
attorneys to make additional closing argument; reopening the evidence 
for limited purposes; or a combination of these measures” are all within 
the purview of the court.153  Model instructions also indicate that the 
judge should emphasize to the jury that the note is in no way intended to 
force a verdict and that the court’s position is to help the jury, not force it 
to come to any conclusion.154  Thus, Arizona seems to understand the 
necessity of letting jurors know that the court will not interfere with the 
job they set out to do, but is willing to provide guidance if necessary.  
This is particularly interesting given the judge’s authoritative position; 
these instructions do not imply that the juror must fall in line with the 
judge’s instruction.  Instead, jurors might be more inclined to see the 
judge as someone to guide and clarify, not command.155 
                                                 
149 United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419 (1969) (finding that the Allen charge was 
not unduly coercive, as it was given as part of the main instruction).  See also United States 
v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding there was no error in giving the jury the 
charge in the main body of the instructions). 
150 A.B.A. Standards, supra note 61, at 5.  “The jury may be discharged without having 
agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.”  
Id. 
151 See Kassin et al., supra note 57. 
152 See 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.4 (2007) (“If the jury advises the court that it has 
reached an impasse in its deliberations, the court may, in the presence of counsel, inquire of 
the jurors to determine whether and how court and counsel can assist them in their 
deliberative process.  After receiving the jurors’ response, if any, the judge may direct that 
further proceedings occur as appropriate.”). 
153 Id. cmt. (1995 Amendment). 
154 Id. 
155 Unfortunately, no data is currently available for the hung jury rates of Arizona.  A 
comparison of rates before and after the statute would be informative. 
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Another possible way to avoid the issues associated with the Allen 
charge is to relax the unanimity requirement for juries.156  While a 
thorough discussion of unanimity requirements is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is worth noting that allowing non-unanimous verdicts 
could decrease the rates of hung juries and decrease the use of the Allen 
charge.157  Not requiring unanimous verdicts, for example, can reduce 
pressure on holdout jurors, who are allowed to take part in the process 
and state their position, even if the majority of the jury votes the other 
way.  This might allow for more overall satisfaction with the process; 
jurors are able to do the job they agreed to do without having to 
compromise their convictions. 
While it is promising that a number of courts have adopted modified 
Allen charges, they still contain some inherent coerciveness and pressure 
the jury to reach a decision.158  Recognizing this, some jurisdictions have 
prohibited the use of these supplemental instructions altogether.159  
Admittedly, this could result in more hung juries and additional costs for 
courts.160  Hence, the question remains as to whether these financial costs 
                                                 
156 Currently all federal courts require unanimous jury verdicts, as do all state courts, 
with the exception of Louisiana and Oregon.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a) (requiring a 
unanimous jury verdict).  But see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.  art. 782 (2004); ORE. REV. 
STAT. §136.450 (2004) (providing that the state does not require a unanimous jury verdict in 
a criminal case).  In civil cases, the requirement for unanimity has been less fixed.  Federal 
courts require unanimity, but less than half of state courts do.  FED. R. CIV. P. 48(1).  For a 
more in-depth discussions see generally, Emil J. Bove, Note, Preserving the Value of 
Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in Anti-Deadlock Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J. 251 (2008); Shari 
Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement:  The Behavior of the Non-
Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. 
Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us . . . What to Do When Jurors Disagree, 9 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLENARY L.J. 429 (2000). 
157 For discussions about the unanimity requirement in jury decision making see 
generally, Lora M. Levett et al., The Psychology of Jury and Juror Decision Making, in 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:  AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 365-406 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. 
Williams eds., The Guilford Press 2005); Yohsuke Ohtsubo et al., Effects of Group Decision 
Rules on Decisions Involving Continuous Alternatives:  The Unanimity Rule and Extreme 
Decisions in Mock Civil Juries, 40 J. EXP. &SOCIAL. PSYCHOL. 320 (2004). 
158 See supra notes 152, 153, 156 and accompanying text. 
159 See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (1969); United States v. E. Med. 
Billing, Inc., 230 F.3d 600 (3d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming the disallowance of the Allen charge). 
160 The Fioravanti court noted that hung juries, while not desirable, are still part of the 
process.  In Fioravanti, the court emphasized: 
The possibility of a hung jury is as much a part of our jury unanimity 
schema as are verdicts of guilty or not guilty.  And although dictates of 
sound judicial administration tend to encourage the rendition of 
verdicts rather than suffer the experience of hung juries, nevertheless, 
it is a cardinal principle of the law that a trial judge may not coerce a 
jury to the extent of demanding that they return a verdict. 
412 F.2d. at 417. 
Thimsen et al.: The Dynamite Charge:  Too Explosive for Its Own Good?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
122 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
outweigh the costs (to a defendant and to society) of convictions when a 
jury is not entirely sure of the defendant’s guilt, but some jurors feel 
coerced to conform to the majority’s position. 
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The changes discussed above are likely a positive step in alleviating 
some of the problems associated with the Allen charge.  Even so, it is not 
safe to assume that these modifications have solved the problems.  
Researchers can play an important role in determining the future of the 
Allen charge.  Specifically, social science research can be conducted to 
provide the court with information about the effects of the Allen charge.  
A few recommended avenues of research are highlighted here. 
First, research is needed to test whether or not the Allen charge 
actually does influence jurors in the ways discussed here.  For instance, 
do jurors receiving an Allen charge rely on heuristics and stereotypes?  
Do they tend to ignore information they feel is less diagnostic (yet may 
still be legally relevant)?  Research should be conducted with mock 
jurors who are allowed to deliberate in person and for longer periods of 
time.  Such steps not only increase the verisimilitude of the research, 
they also help ensure that the results are likely to apply to real world 
trials.  Future studies that address the limitations of past studies provide 
more complete information about the effects of the Allen charge.  Other 
studies should survey or interview actual jurors who received the Allen 
charge.  Because all studies have strengths and weaknesses, a variety of 
studies using diverse methodologies should be used to provide more 
information about the effects of the Allen charge on juror decisions.  
Second, research should test whether the modified Allen charge fixes 
the problems associated with the original Allen charge.  As noted above, 
the ABA suggests a modified instruction, but it has not yet been 
empirically tested.  Research with both mock and real jurors could 
determine whether the ABA’s instruction reaches its potential.  
Finally, research is needed to determine how hung juries affect all 
individuals involved in the trial.  Although a hung jury may be 
dissatisfying to jurors (particularly if they feel that they wasted their 
time) this Article points out that jurors may also have negative feelings 
about being pressured to change their verdict.  Although some research 
has investigated juror stress, none has specifically studied the stress and 
emotional reactions of jurors in hung juries.  Others may also later feel 
                                                                                                             
 Interestingly, California likely has more mistrials due to deadlocked juries than any 
other state.  Some suggest that this is due to the fact that California rid itself of the Allen 
charge in 1977.  See Reichelt, supra note 59; Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 37. 
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negative emotions as a result of being involved in a trial that hangs.  
Research is lacking on the effects of hung juries on lawyers, judges, and 
the parties to the trial (e.g., defendant, plaintiff), who might feel that they 
wasted their time and effort or that the outcome was unfair.  This 
information would be helpful in determining whether hung juries are a 
major problem in terms of the satisfaction and emotional reactions of the 
individuals involved in the trial.  
Legal decisions, such as whether to allow the Allen charge, can often 
benefit from social science research.  While not all lawmakers and judges 
consider social science research when making their decisions, some do.161  
Thus, it is important to make such information available.  Sound 
research can help to protect the rights of the parties involved and the 
integrity of the justice system as a whole. 
                                                 
161 See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002). 
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